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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Jack Cahill Steelsmith, Jr. appeals from the district court's orders imposing court
costs, a fine and driver's license suspension, relinquishing jurisdiction, and denying his
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence following his conviction for felony driving while
intoxicated.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Steelsmith was charged with felony driving under the influence ("OUI") and pled
guilty to that charge pursuant to an agreement with the state. (R., pp.29-30, 49-56; Tr.,
pp.1-17.) The district court sentenced Steelsmith to a unified term of ten years with two
years fixed and placed him in the retained jurisdiction (i.e., "rider") program at North
Idaho Correctional Institution for up to one year. (R., pp.61-64.) The court "defer[red]
the imposition of costs, fines and other assessments" until the rider review hearing. (R.,
p.62; Tr., p.36, Ls.17-20.) At the end of Steelsmith's rider, NICI staff recommended that
the court relinquish jurisdiction. (APSI, p.1. 1) The court followed that recommendation
at the rider review hearing and, after reducing the indeterminate portion of Steelsmith's
sentence from eight years to five years, ordered his sentence executed. (R., pp.68-72;
Tr., p.50, Ls.6-14.)

At the end of the hearing, the court ordered Steelsmith to pay

$520.50 in court costs and a $3,000 fine, and suspended his driver's license for three
years following his release. (R., p.70; Tr., p.50, Ls.15-24.) Steelsmith filed a Rule 35

1

HAPSI" is the shorthand reference to the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation.

1

motion to reduce his sentence (R., p.7S), which the court denied
Steele

a timely appeal. (R., pp.73-76.)

2

, pp.36-40).

ISSUES
Steelsmith states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Whether the district court erred by imposing various punishments at
the rider review hearing in violation of jurisdictional limitations and the
state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
2.
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction by not sufficiently considering the factors which indicated that
Mr. Steelsmith would be able to succeed in a less structured environment.
3.
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr.
Steelsmith's Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of the new
evidence he presented.
(Appellant's Brief, p.?)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Steelsmith failed to show the district court erred in deferring its sentencing
rulings regarding court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the rider
review hearing?
2.
Has Steelsmith failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Steel smith Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Deferring Its Sentencing
Rulings Regarding Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension Until The
Rider Review Hearing
A.

Introduction
Steelsmith argues that the district court erred by deferring its sentencing rulings

in regard to court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the rider review
hearing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-17.) He contends the district court lost jurisdiction after
the sentencing hearing to make such deferred rulings and that the imposition of
additional costs placed him in double jeopardy.

(Id.)

Contrary to Steelsmith's

arguments, the district court had jurisdiction to defer its rulings until the rider review
hearing, and those rulings did not place Steelsmith in double jeopardy inasmuch as he
had not been placed in former jeopardy in regard to them.

B.

Standard Of Review
'''A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when brought to

[the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to considering the merits
of an appeal.'"

State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003)

(quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987».

Whether a court has

jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483,80 P.3d
at 1084. Whether an appellant's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy has
been violated is a question of law subject to free review. State v. Hansen, 127 Idaho
675,678,904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995).

4

C.

The District Court Did Not Lose Jurisdiction To Order Court Costs, A Fine, And
Driver's License Suspension By Deferring Decisions On Those Matters Until The
Rider Review Hearing
"[A]bsent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to

amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by
expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v.
Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P. 3d 711, 714 (2003). Unless otherwise authorized, a
district court loses jurisdiction to modify or alter a defendant's sentence once that
sentence has been imposed and executed. McFraland v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262,266,313
P.2d 1076, 1078 (1957) ("The great weight of authority supports the rule that when,
under a judgment, a valid sentence has been put into execution, the trial court cannot
amend or modify it ... and that any attempt so to do is of no effect."); State v. Johnson,
101 Idaho 581, 585, 618 P.2d 759, 763 (1980).2 Steelsmith asserts his sentence was

2 In Johnson, 101 Idaho at 584-585, 618 P.2d at 762-763, the Idaho Supreme Court
applied the same principle where the defendant's sentence was increased, explaining:
Defendant Johnson also contends that the district court erred in
increasing his sentence to a fixed five year term after initially sentencing
him to an indeterminate term.
Johnson was sentenced to an
indeterminate term not to exceed three years on April 29, 1977, and was
given until May 3, 1977, to surrender and commence serving his
sentence. Johnson did not surrender on May 3, and a bench warrant was
issued for his arrest. When Johnson was apprehended he was brought
before the district court and resentenced to a fixed term of five years
pursuant to I.C. s 19-2513A. Johnson argues that the district court was
without jurisdiction to enhance his original sentence.
This Court held in McFarland (sic) v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262, 313 P.2d
1076 (1957), that once a valid sentence has been put into execution the
trial court cannot modify it. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51
S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931). However, the original sentence imposed
on Johnson was never put into execution. Following the sentencing, the
court granted Johnson three days to enable him to attend to his personal

5

imposed and executed before his retained jurisdiction period began, and therefore,
had no jurisdiction to defer its sentencing rulings regarding court costs, a fine,
driver's license suspension until the rider review hearing. (Appellant's Brief, pp.812.) Steelsmith's argument does not hold up under closer examination.
Under I.C. § 19-2601 (4), a court may retain jurisdiction after a sentence has been
pronounced. The principal purpose of retained jurisdiction is to evaluate the defendant
for his or her receptiveness to rehabilitation or probation. State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho
238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004).

During the period of retained

jurisdiction, the district court shares jurisdiction with the Idaho Board of Correction.
State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 44, 878 P.2d 213, 218 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The statute
enables the court and the Board essentially to exercise concurrent authority over the
offender for a limited period."). The court's jurisdiction lapses at the end of the retained
jurisdiction period "before which time the court must decide whether to grant probation
or relinquish jurisdiction and execute the defendant's original sentence."

State v.

Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812, 241 P.3d 981, 985 (Ct. App. 2010). "Idaho appellate
courts have long adhered to the principle that a sentence is imposed when initially

affairs prior to commencing his sentence. Upon Johnson's failure to
surrender to commence serving his sentence at the appointed time on
May 3, 1977, the district court issued a bench warrant for Johnson's
arrest. Johnson's subsequent arrest in Arizona and extradition to Idaho
were made pursuant to the bench warrant issued May 5, 1977. Prior to
his resentencing on July 11, 1977, Johnson had not been placed in the
custody of the Board of Corrections under his original sentence and
commitment. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to withdraw its
sentence and impose a new one since the defendant has not commenced
serving the original sentence.
(Footnote omitted, emphasis added.)

6

pronounced, even though jurisdiction is retained under I.C. § 19-2601 (4) or the
sentence is suspended." State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248,249,970 P.2d 516, 517 (Ct.
App.1998).

1.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction Because It Did Not "Impose" Its
Sentence Of Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension Prior
To The Rider Review Hearing

Steelsmith's insistence that the sentencing measures deferred to, and ordered at
the rider review hearing increased his sentence is based on the fiction that the court
imposed a sentence of no court costs, no fine, and no driver's license suspension
during the initial sentencing hearing. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12 ("the district court
did not have jurisdiction at the rider review hearing to increase Mr. Steelsmith's
sentence by imposing new fines, costs, and suspensions").) The record reflects that the
district court's rulings on courts costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension were not
imposed, much less ordered into execution, before the rider review hearing. Therefore,
the district court had jurisdiction to decide those matters. See McFraland, 79 Idaho at
266, 313 P.2d at 1078; Johnson, 101 Idaho at 585, 618 P.2d at 763. At the end of
Steelsmith's sentencing hearing, the court said:
I will defer imposition of court costs other [sic] statutory
assessments, and I'll defer deciding on a driver's license suspension until I
see the report from the institution.
(Tr., p.36, Ls.17-20.) In its Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction,
the court reiterated it would "defer imposition of court costs, fines and other
assessments, if any, and will take these up at the rider review hearing." (R., p.62.) It is
apparent from both its verbal and written orders from the sentencing hearing that the

7

district court never imposed or executed any rulings regarding court costs, a fine, or
driver's license suspension prior to the rider review hearing. To the contrary, the court
specifically deferred imposing such sentencing measures until the later hearing.
Steelsmith's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to defer imposing
some of its sentencing rulings until the rider review hearing is based on the misplaced
notion that differing portions of his sentence could not be imposed at separate times.
(Appellant's Brief, p.9 ("there is only one point at which the district court may impose
punishments - the sentencing hearing"), p.11 ("the district court only had jurisdiction to
impose a sentence on Mr. Steelsmith at his sentencing hearing")); see State v. Ward,
135 Idaho 68, 71, 14 P.3d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 2000) ("At his sentencing hearing, Ward
informed the district court that he had discovered that the task force officers had
videotaped the search of the packages and that he was considering withdrawing his
guilty plea. The district court proceeded with the hearing but deferred pronouncement
of the sentence."). A court has "inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently
manage the cases before it." Department of Labor and Indus. Servo

V.

East Idaho Mills,

Inc., 111 Idaho 137, 138-139, 721 P.2d 736, 737-738 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal citations
omitted).

This inherent power must be weighed against the court's duty to "do

substantial justice."

.kl

Steelsmith has not presented any viable authority to support his

argument that the district court acted outside either its jurisdiction or inherent power to
efficiently manage its cases by deferring its rulings on the three reserved matters (court
costs, etc.) until the rider review hearing. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12.) The closest
authority cited is State

V.

Coassolo, 136, Idaho 138, 142-143, 30 P.3d 293, 297-298

(2001), quoted for the proposition that "[s]entencing occurs before the period of retained

8

jurisdiction begins, not when jurisdiction is relinquished."

(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)

However, Coassolo does not state that a sentencing court cannot expressly defer
making one or more sentencing rulings until a rider review hearing, where the decision
on whether to grant probation or relinquish jurisdiction is also made.

Even if most

sentences are fully imposed before a retained jurisdiction period commences, that does
not mean that district courts may not, in their discretion, defer imposing one or more
aspects of a sentence after the sentencing hearing.

None of the cases cited by

Steelsmith hold otherwise. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12.)

2.

The District Court Had Jurisdiction Because It Did Not "Execute" Its
Sentence Of Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension Prior
To The Rider Review Hearing

Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court modified or altered Steelsmith's
previously "imposed" sentence upward at the rider review hearing with regard to court
costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension (and especially if it did not), the court had
jurisdiction to do so because the sentence was not also previously "executed." See
McFraland, 79 Idaho at 266, 313 P.2d at 1078 (a court loses jurisdiction to alter a
defendant's sentence once that sentence has been imposed and executed); Johnson,
101 Idaho at 585, 618 P.2d at 763 (sentence increase prior to execution of sentence
affirmed). There is a difference between when a sentence is imposed and when it is
executed. As explained in State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472,474,567 P.2d 17, 19 (1977):
Appellant then points out the distinction between the imposition of a
sentence and the execution of a sentence. In Kriebel v. United States, 10
F.2d 762 (th Cir. 1926), the court stated,
"The imposition of a sentence means laying the sentence
upon the defendant, that is, the act of sentencing him; the
9

imposition of a sentence and the execution of it are two
different things, and the suspension of one is a different
thing from the suspension of the other."
Here, the "act of sentencing" occurred on November 18. By
retaining jurisdiction for 120 days pursuant to I.C. s 19-2601 (4), the court
then suspended the execution of the already imposed sentence. The
order of March 17, 1976 thus effectuated the execution of the sentence.
(Emphasis added.) See State v. Salsgiver, 112 Idaho 933, 934, 736 P.2d 1387, 1388
(Ct. App. 1987); Bojorquez v. State, 135 Idaho 758, 761, 24 P .3d 706, 709 (Ct. App.
2000) ("Idaho appellate courts have long adhered to the principle that a sentence is
imposed when initially pronounced even if its execution is later postponed when the trial
court suspends the sentence or retains jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4).").
Ditmars demonstrates that when a sentence of retained jurisdiction is
pronounced, such pronouncement constitutes the "imposition" of sentence; however, it
is the order relinquishing jurisdiction following the period of retained jurisdiction that
"effectuat[es] the execution" of that sentence. Ditmars, 98 Idaho at 474, 567 P.2d at 19.
The same is true in Steelsmith's case -- the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction after the rider review hearing effectuated the execution of his sentence.
Because Steelsmith has failed to show that his sentence was executed prior to when
the court made its three deferred sentencing rulings at the rider review hearing, he has
also failed to show the district court lacked jurisdiction to defer making those rulings until
that hearing. McFraland, 79 Idaho at 266, 313 P.2d at 1078; Johnson, 101 Idaho at
585,618 P.2d at 763; see State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939,940,842 P.2d 275, 276
(1992) (trial court had jurisdiction to resentence defendant to a longer sentence after he
made threats against the judge and a police officer immediately after the initial
10

sentencing hearing because he had not "been placed in the custody of the board of
correction under the original sentence and commitment").

3.

Conclusion

Inasmuch as the district court neither imposed nor executed Steelsmith's
sentence with regard to court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the
rider review hearing, it had jurisdiction over Steelsmith to make such rulings. Steelsmith
has failed to show that the district court lacked jurisdiction to defer its sentencing rulings
on those matters.

D.

Steelsmith Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, Based
Upon Double Jeopardy Grounds, In The District Court's Sentencing Orders For
Court Costs, A Fine, And Driver's License Suspension At The Rider Review
Hearing
Steelsmith next contends that the district court's imposition of court costs, a fine,

and driver's license suspension 3 at the rider review hearing violated his constitutional
protections against double jeopardy and, although not objected to below, constitutes
fundamental error under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-17.) A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a
timely objection may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error."
State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).

In the

absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly
circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or

3 Steelsmith does not include his driver's license suspension in the headings of his
double jeopardy issue. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) However, he does allude to
this driver's license suspension at one point in the body of his argument. (Id., p.14.)
11

her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair
Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.

in a fair tribunaL" Perry, 150

Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the

defendant demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record,
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that
the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a reasonable
probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings."
226, 245 P.3d at 978.

kL.

at

Steelsmith's claim of fundamental error fails on all three

elements required by Perry.
The prohibition against double jeopardy encompasses both multiple prosecutions
and multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 343,
127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,756,810 P.2d 680, 694
(1991); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). In regard to double jeopardy
based on multiple punishments, the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Avelar,
132 Idaho 775,778,979 P.2d 648,651 (1999):
The multiple punishment component has been interpreted to provide two
different protections. First, this component "is designed to ensure that the
sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the
legislature." [Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984)]. It thus prohibits
the imposition of a sentence in excess of that authorized by the
legislature. Second, in U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104
L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), the United States Supreme Court extended this
aspect of double jeopardy to prohibit punishments imposed in separate
proceedings even when authorized by the legislature.
U[A] criminal defendant attempting to preclude issues from being relitigated in a
subsequent prosecution must establish that the defendant was placed in 'jeopardy' in
12

the earlier proceeding." State v. Gusman, 125 Idaho 805, 808, 874 P.2d 1112, 1115
(1994); State v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707,708,819 P.2d 561, 562 (1991). In addition to
showing he was placed in such former (or "original") jeopardy, a defendant must show
that the former jeopardy has been terminated.

The Supreme Court explained in

Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086 (1984), "the
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been
some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy."

Accord

Yeager v. U.S., 557 U.S. 110, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 2369 (2009) (quoting same). Steelsmith
has failed to point to any event that terminated the original jeopardy of his sentence
prior to the court's orders for court costs and a fine.
In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), the Supreme Court
modified the standard for determining when a sentence has been finalized or terminated
and jeopardy established. As explained by the federal district court in United States v.
Groceman, 882 F.Supp. 976, 978 (E.D. Wash. 1995), DiFrancesco ruled that "jeopardy
does not attach to a sentence until the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the
finality of his sentence."4 In United States v. Arrellano Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir.

4 The full statement in Groceman, 882 F.Supp. at 977-978, is:
United States v. Von Moos[, 660 F.2d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1981),] says that
"[j]eopardy attaches in the double punishment context when the defendant
begins serving the sentence." 660 F.2d at 749. As authority, Von Moos
cites United States v. Ford[, 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980)]. Ford, in turn,
relies upon Kennedy v. United States, 330 F.2d 26, 27 (9th Cir. 1964).
See Ford, 632 F.2d at 1380. What the defendant fails to recognize is that
Kennedy's statements concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause (e.g., that
jeopardy attaches when a defendant begins serving his sentence) are no
longer sound law. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137,
101 S.Ct. 426, 437, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); United States v. Andersson,
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1986) (citations omitted), the Ninth Circuit summarized the holding in DiFrancesco in the
following manner: 5

813 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9 th Cir. 1987). While Kennedy is still relevant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c), United States v. MorenoHernandez, 48 F.3d 1112,1115-16 (9th Cir. 1995), the proposition for
which the defendant cites it has since been rejected by the Supreme
Court.
In DiFrancesco, the government appealed a sentence imposed by
the district court, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion in
imposing that particular sentence. The Second Circuit dismissed the
government's appeal on double jeopardy grounds. 449 U.S. at 123, 101
S.Ct. at 430. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that jeopardy does
not attach to a sentence until the defendant has a legitimate expectation in
the finality of his sentence. 449 U.S. at 137-139, 101 S.Ct. at 437-38.
In People v. Williams, 925 N.E.2d 878, 888 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010), the.New York Court
of Appeals further explained how DiFrancesco modified double jeopardy law:

5

In Bozza [v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 167 (1947)], the sentencing
error was promptly corrected the same day the original sentence was
declared.
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently extended this rule beyond
same-day corrections in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101
S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). There, the Court held that the
protection against multiple punishments prevents a sentence from being
increased once the defendant has a legitimate expectation in the finality of
the sentence (see id. at 135- 136, 101 S.Ct. 426). Because federal law
allowed the government to request that the sentence be set aside on
appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's legitimate
expectation of finality did not attach "until the [government's] appeal is
concluded or the time to appeal has expired" (id. at 136, 101 S.Ct. 426).
Until then, the defendant is on notice that the sentence may be increased
at any time before those events occur (see id.).
Similarly, in People ex reI. Pamblanco v. Warden, Rikers Island Correctional Facility,
868 N.Y.S.2d 505, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008), the court explained:
There is no bright-line period set by statute or case law that indicates
Instead, the
when double jeopardy is violated upon resentencing.
Supreme Court introduced the more amorphous concept of "expectation of
14

DiFrancesco held that the constitutional finality and conclusiveness that
attach to a jury's verdict of acquittal do not attach to a criminal sentence at
the time it is pronounced. 449 U.S. at 132, 101 S.Ct. at 434. The Court
also held that jeopardy does not attach at the time a defendant begins
serving his sentence where the defendant has no reasonable expectation
of finality in the original sentence. Id. at 139, 101 S.Ct. at 438. The
defendant in DiFrancesco had no expectation of finality because Congress
had specifically provided that his sentence was subject to appeal by either
the defendant or the government.
(Emphasis added). Here, as in DiFrancesco, Steelsmith had no reasonable expectation
of finality in the original sentence. The district court specifically informed him at the
sentencing hearing, and reiterated in its initial sentencing order, that it was deferring its
sentencing rulings on court costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension until the rider
review hearing. Steelsmith could not have reasonably believed his sentence relative to
those issues was in any way determined, much less final.

Accordingly, under

DiFrancesco, former jeopardy did not attach to Steelsmith's sentence in regard to those
matters before the rider review hearing, and he therefore could not have been in double
jeopardy at the time of that hearing.
Steelsmith has failed to demonstrate that the district court's sentences of court
costs, a fine, and driver's license suspension violated his constitutional right to not be
placed in double jeopardy.

Therefore, Steelsmith has failed to meet the first two

requirements for demonstrating fundamental error under Perry; that one or more of the
his unwaived constitutional rights were violated, and that such constitutional error is
clear or obvious on the record.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Further,

because Steelsmith has failed to demonstrate a constitutional error based on double

finality." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 101 S.Ct. 426,
66 L.Ed. 2d 328 (1980).
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jeopardy grounds, he necessarily has failed to show that any constitutional error
"affected the outcome of the trial court proceeding." 19..:.

II.
Steelsmith Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction And Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction
Of Sentence

A.

Introduction
Steelsmith pled guilty to felony DUI and the district court imposed a unified

sentence of ten years with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R, pp.29-30; 4956, 61-64.) As noted by the court, rather than take advantage of the rider opportunity,
the Department of Correction concluded Steelsmith was "markedly unsuccessful in [his]
programming," leading to a recommendation that the district court relinquish jurisdiction.
(Tr., p.47, Ls.2-16; APSI, p.3.)

The court followed that recommendation and

relinquished jurisdiction, reiterating the Department's conclusions that Steelsmith failed
to take any responsibility for his behavior, he "remain[ed] at a higher risk for reoffending
because of [his] unwillingness to admit and accept the fact that [he is] an alcoholic," and
he failed to take advantage of a number of opportunities to correct his behavior. (Tr.,
p.47, Ls.5-19.)

Before executing sentence, the court sua sponte reduced the

indeterminate portion of Steelsmith's sentence from eight years to five years. (R, p.69.)
The court thereafter denied Steelsmith's Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
(Supp. R, pp.36-40.)
On appeal, Steelsmith argues that "[t]he district court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion in light of the improvements he made during his
period of retained jurisdiction, in addition to all the other mitigating factors present in his
16

case." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) He also challenges the denial of his Rule 35 motion,
contending the district court insufficiently considered new evidence demonstrating his
amenability to treatment, acceptance into community-based treatment programs, and
letters from family members who continued to support him. (Id., p.29.) Steelsmith has
failed to establish an abuse of discretion. A review of the record supports the district
court's determination, following the period of retained jurisdiction, that Steelsmith was
not an appropriate candidate for probation, and his new evidence was not sufficient to
entitle him to a reduction of his sentence under Rule 35.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore,

131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Steelsmith Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Relinquishing Jurisdiction
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of

the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711,712,639 P.2d 9,10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho
203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583,
584 (Ct. App. 1984). Contrary to Steelsmith's assertions on appeal, a review of the
17

record in this case supports the district court's determination that Steelsmith was not a
suitable candidate for probation, particularly in light of Steelsmith's less than stellar
performance during his period of retained jurisdiction.
Steelsmith is a man with a long history of driving while intoxicated. He was first
convicted of driving under the influence in 1995, followed by similar convictions in 1997
(2 nd offense), 1999 (amended from felony to misdemeanor), 2003 (commercial vehicle),
2005 (2 nd offense), 2006 (2 nd offense), and his current felony DUI conviction in 2010.
(PSI, pp.3-5.) In addition to now having seven DUI convictions, Steelsmith had DUI
charges dismissed in 1995 and 1998. (PSI, p.4.)
Despite his long string of DUI convictions, the district court exercised leniency in
retaining jurisdiction to afford Steelsmith the opportunity to prove his amenability to
community supervision.

(R., pp.61-63.)

Steelsmith failed to take advantage of that

opportunity, however, as NICI staff recommended jurisdiction be relinquished for the
following reasons:
While at North Idaho Correctional Institution, Mr. Steelsmith demonstrated
himself as an individual who would not take responsibility for his behavior
after numerous interventions from the NICI staff. It is a serious concern
that Mr. Steelsmith presented himself as an individual who is unwilling to
take an honest view of himself, and identify how his continued criminal
thinking lead [sic] to continued negative consequences. He remains at a
higher risk for reoffending within the community due to his unwillingness to
admit and accept his addictive disease and not allowing himself to move
Mr. Steelsmith has had several
away from his high denial level.
opportunities to correct his behavior through interventions from the TC[6]
6 "TC" refers to the Therapeutic Community at NICI, which is "a 9 to 12-month program
that is designed and structured to create an environment for social learning and
change." (APSI, p.1.) The TC program is a full-time "intensive learning experience in
which TC participants' behaviors, attitudes, values and emotions are continually
monitored, [sic] and corrected or reinforced as a part of the daily regime." (Id.) All TC
participants "attend and complete Cognitive Self-Change, Relapse Prevention, and
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programming and NICI staff. Whenever any TC participants or NICI staff
attempted to have him look at his negative behavior he would use
diversion tactics to blame the other person for correcting his behavior.
Throughout his TC programming he seemed to have a high need to place
himself in the victim-stance, which became a barrier for him to make the
changes necessary to create prosocial [sic] thinking and behavior.
(APSI, pp.3-4.)
In addition to failing to take responsibility for his behavior, Steelsmith amassed
26 "pull-ups by his peers in the TC programming" for a variety of negative behaviors,
including failing to listen or consider input and feedback from other TC participants,
eating candy in an unauthorized area, being disrespectful to others, and breaking rules
on the chain of communication.

(APSI, p.5.)

Steelsmith did complete his Career

Planning and Portfolio and Education Classes.

NICI staff determined, however, that

those accomplishments did not outweigh Steelsmith's "self-defeating cycle that seems
to begin with placing himself in the victim-stance and choosing not to take any
responsibility for his own negative behavior." (APSI, p.7.) In light of this information,
the district court acted well within its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.
Steelsmith argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by failing
to adequately consider his age (54 at the time of sentencing),7 his brother's in-court

attend school. In addition, they participate in several meetings and intense drug and
alcohol treatment that include daily living." (Id.)
7 Steelsmith correctly notes that the Idaho Court of Appeals indicated in Cook v. State,
145 Idaho 482,489, 180 P.3d 521,528 (Ct. App. 2008), that increasing age may lessen
the risk of recidivism. See State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,639,759 P.2d 926, 930 (Ct.
App. 1988). However, Steelsmith fails to explain why his age made it more likely he
would comply with the law while on probation, but conversely, his age made it more
difficult to comply with the rules of the rider program. (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-23.) Even
assuming Steelsmith is correct in asserting the rider program is "designed for, and
populated by, people more than half his age" (Appellant's Brief, p.20), that does not
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statement that Steelsmith had recently and for the first time admitted being an alcoholic,
he had temporary housing arranged with the Boise Rescue Mission, he had the support
of family (including his long-estranged daughter), he had a solid work history, and his
current conviction was his first felony. (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-23; p.48, Ls.13-16; Appellant's
Brief, pp.21-25.) Steelsmith's belief that the district court should have assigned more
weight to some or all of that information does not render the APSl's portrayal of his
performance during his period of retained jurisdiction inaccurate.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Steelsmith was not an appropriate candidate for community
supervision. This conclusion is supported by Steelsmith's' repetitive history of driving
while under the influence and the attendant risk he presents to the community, his
lackluster performance in the rider program, his refusal to accept responsibility for his
alcohol use, and the recommendation of NICI staff. Given any reasonable view of the
facts, Steelsmith has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
relinquishing jurisdiction.

D.

Steelsmith Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Denying His Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Sentence
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007).

Steelsmith did not appeal his underlying sentence.

Therefore, to

logically lead to Steelsmith's conclusions that "[t]he age gap would create the difficulty
to trust his community members" and "his age had a significant impact on his ability to
complete the program" (id., p.21).
20

prevail on his claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion, Steelsmith must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion."

1.9.:.; see also State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008)

(absent the presentation of new evidence, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence). Steelsmith has
failed to satisfy his burden.
The new information Steelsmith submitted in support of his Rule 35 motion
included the following documents, as described by the district court:
(a) his initial classification score sheet from the Idaho State Correctional
Institution; (b) a handwritten letter from Steelsmith discussing the various
classes he has been taking and discussing the positive impact these
classes have had on him; (c) a progress report for a cognitive self-change
class, indicating satisfactory attendance and participation and high scores
in each level; (d) an official transcript from the National Center for
Construction Education and Research, indicating completion of a basic
safety course; (e) a certificate of achievement for computer literacy, issued
by the Robert Janss School; (f) a completed Career Planning and
Employment Portfolio Checklist indicating Steelsmith has completed 15
hours of lab work and 6 classroom hours in the listed categories; (g) a
card showing that he has completed a ten hour Occupational Safety and
Health Training Course in general industrial safety and health; (h) a letter
from the Boise Rescue Mission Ministries stating that Steelsmith has been
accepted as a member of the New Life Recovery Program at the River of
life Rescue Mission; and (i) two letters of support from family members.
(Supp. R., p.38 n.1.)
The district court considered this information and rejected it as a basis for
reducing Steelsmith's sentence, agreeing with the state's assessment that "Steelsmith
has not cited a legally sufficient reason for reconsideration and that the imposed
sentence is still appropriate given Steelsmith's history of D.U.1. offenses." (Supp. R.,
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p.38.)

The district court considered ail of the relevant information and reasonably

determined that Steelsmith failed to show through his new information that his sentence
was excessive.

Steelsmith has failed to establish that the district court abused its

discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders for
fines and court costs, relinquishing jurisdiction, and denying Steelsmith's Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2012.
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